continue to challenge the constitutionality of anonymous juries under the Sixth Amendment. In response, courts use balancing tests to weigh defendants' constitutional rights against jurors' security concerns. 8 This Comment argues that the courts overlook important Founding-era evidence on juror accountability. It concludes that the Public Trial Clause does not require juror identification. Part I describes the Public Trial Clause accountability argument made against the anonymous jury. Part II then turns to the evidence rebutting this argument-namely, that the First Congress treated juror identification requirements as statutory law, not constitutional law, and that the accountability argument is inconsistent with the theory of juries that prevailed at the Founding.
I. THE PUBLIC TRIAL CLAUSE AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY REqUIREMENT
Criminal defendants strenuously resist the spread of anonymous juries. The Shryock defendants, 9 for example, claimed that juror anonymity violated their Public Trial Clause" 0 rights. This argument, elaborated more fully in other sources, is essentially that "public trials produce greater reliability because the [jurors] are accountable" to the observing public." Conversely, the "deindividuation" of anonymity strips jurors of personal responsibility and dilutes their sense of duty. 2 The Public Trial Clause, they argue, checks State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998); State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 282 (Ohio 2001) (holding only that anonymous juries do not constitute structural constitutional error); State v. Tucker, 657 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Wis. 2003 court than in secret proceedings. '' 1 8 On the historical front, Professor Daniel Blinka has claimed that Founding-era jurors "risked damaging their own reputations" when they reached unpopular verdicts. 9 Together, their writings suggest that anonymous juries lack the reputational stakes essential to reliable trials.
II. FOUNDING-ERA EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
The argument that the Public Trial Clause forbids anonymous juries is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the First Congress rejected a constitutional provision that would have prohibited at least some anonymous juries. The earliest phrasing of the Sixth Amendment required criminal prosecutions to adhere to all the "accustomed requisites" of jury trials' 0 that is, the jury trial customs long followed in England and the colonies. When this phrase was proposed and rejected in 1789,21 juror identification was an accustomed requisite of criminal trials at common law.' Further, English statutory law had expressly guaranteed limited juror identification rights for more than eighty years. 3 In this historical context, the accustomed requisites clause, had it survived, likely would have protected juror identification rights.
But in rejecting the clause, the First Congress suggested that juror identification is a nonconstitutional issue. As Justice White commented in a similar Sixth Amendment dispute, the elimination of the accustomed requisites clause is concededly open to the explanation that "accustomed requisites" were thought to be already included in the concept of a "jury." But that explanation is no more plausible than the contrary one: that the i8. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) deletion had some substantive effect. Indeed,... the latter explanation is, if anything, the more plausible .... [W] here Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect.'
Although it rejected a constitutional requirement, the First Congress adopted a statutory juror identification requirement. Borrowing phrases from its familiar English antecedent," the First Crimes Act in 1790 guaranteed juror identification rights to discrete classes of criminal defendants.2 6 That the First Congress bestowed jury identification rights through statute when it had refused to do so in the text of the Sixth Amendment provides strong evidence that the Amendment was not intended to guarantee those rights.
Second, early American policymakers rejected overt means of securing juror accountability, fearing a threat to juror autonomy. Jurors were a buffer on -not the servant of-popular passions. Justice Story, echoing other esteemed constitutional writers in the early Republic, summarized the operative theory:
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. Indeed, it is often more important to guard against the latter, than the former. This principled commitment to jury autonomy is evident throughout Founding-era trial procedure. Take, for starters, the process of choosing a venire: Random selection was the Founding-era norm." 8 consistendy declining Jeffersonian juror election schemes, early policymakers indicated ongoing satisfaction with the relative lack of juror accountability. Third, most of the Founding figures did not endorse even reputational checks on jury discretion. Although it would have been logically consistent to accept reputational accountability while rejecting more overt checks, this does not appear to have been their method. At the Founding, there were reputational accountability arguments, and there were arguments in favor of local jurors -but these two ideas were separate and distinct. Today's criminal defense bar anachronistically conflates these two arguments, asserting that local jurors in the Founding era were seen as more reliable because they were known and reputationally accountable for their actions.
To be sure, Founding-era literature 6 on the Public Trial Clause discusses reputational accountability extensively. But the literature contemplates reputational checks on judges and witnesses -not on jurors. Publius, William Blackstone, and Matthew Hale, among others, agreed that public observation incentivized judges to behave properly: "[I]f the judge be partial, his partiality and injustice will be evident to all by-standers." 3 7 Blackstone and Hale further agreed that witnesses would be less apt to lie in public settings: "[A] witness may frequently depose that in private, which he will [b]e ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal" in the "presence of all mankind.", 8 But as for the public reputations of jurors, the original Public Trial Clause literature is silent.
Meanwhile, the Founding-era literature supports local jurors, but for nonreputational reasons. Local juries "were supposed to have .. a prior and a perfect knowledge ... of the characters of the parties themselves, as of the witnesses." 39 Local juries were further known to have "private knowledge of [the] facts," which they were to consider in addition to any evidence presented at trial.
4 ' The jurors were valued for their familiarity with the locale -not for the locale's familiarity with the jurors.
The "stranger jury" debate illustrates this distinction well. When submitted to the states for ratification in 1787, the Constitution guaranteed only that a These concerns were not unfounded. See Blinka, supra note 19, at 169-70 (describing how a majority of jurors in some early federal trials were summoned from relatively distant places).
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See 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 42, at 547 (recording Edmund Pendleton's observation at the Virginia ratification convention that the latter was more faithful to the traditional vicinage rationale). 
